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THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

MARSHALL T. MAYS*

INTRODUCTION
Although the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is a small
and relatively new U. S. Government Corporation, since its inception
two and one-half years ago its staff and management have worked daily
to find practical solutions to many of the problems involved in the
settlement of economic disputes in Latin America. Recently, several
issues relating to OPIC's role in settling and avoiding investment disputes
and in operating in Latin America have been raised in Congressional
hearings on OPIC. OPIC officials are hopeful that the experience of
the past two and one-half years will, with the assistance of the Congress,
make OPIC an even more effective dispute settling and dispute avoiding
mechanism in the future and assist in arriving at answers to the many
questions facing the United States, U. S. investors, and the countries of
Latin America. Before discussing the issues referred to above, a brief
description of OPIC and its programs would be helpful.

OPIC BACKGROUND AND PROGRAMS
OPIC's charter was enacted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969,
and the Corporation began formal operations on January 19, 1971.
Most of the programs which OPIC operates were previously operated
by the Office of Private Resources of the Agency for International Development. OPIC's programs include:
- insurance of private U. S. investments in developing countries
against the risks of (A) inconvertibility, (B) expropriation, and (C) war,
revolution or insurrection;
*President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
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-guarantees
of U.S. private loans to projects in developing countries against commercial as well as political risks;
- direct dollar loans from the Corporation's capital to assist in
financing private projects in developing countries; and

-financing
of investment surveys and feasibility studies to develop
projects, especially small business and agribusiness opportunities.
Although OPIC's programs are basically the same as those previously
operated by A.I.D., the Congress felt that OPIC's corporate structure
would produce significant benefits by creating and applying a partnership of U. S. private managerial know-how and official policy decisionmaking to the business of international development, thereby resulting
in greater efficiency in the administration of investment incentives within
the confines of U. S. foreign policy. Consistent with these Congressional
objectives, OPIC has found that the corporate approach has produced many
distinctive features, including:
-a
public-private Board of Directors which melds private and
government viewpoints on the direction of the programs;
-a balance sheet discipline which compares income and expenses,
and provides the shareholders, the American people, with complete disclosure and accountability;
-a

small sized staff of high professional competence; and

-a specialized organization dealing solely with U.S. investment in
the LDC's, capable of providing practical advice to investors and other
elements of the U. S. Government.
OPIC'S ROLE IN RESOLVING INVESTMENT DISPUTES
Turning to the issues that have been raised during the OPIC hearings, a question that has been asked repeatedly is whether OPIC plays
a role which is beneficial or harmful to U. S. national interests with respect to disputes with foreign governments arising out of OPIC-insured
investments.
The theory has been advanced by some that the existence of OPIC
insurance causes the U. S. Government to become directly involved in
investment disputes to the detriment of the U. S. national interest. How-
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ever, an examination of the way investment disputes develop and the
manner in which OPIC insurance functions indicates that the role of
OPIC's insurance is a beneficial, not a harmful one.
OPIC and its predecessors have paid or settled 13 expropriation
claims to date, and in not one instance has OPIC involved the U. S. Government in a dispute with a foreign government. Therefore, the argument that OPIC can lead to such involvement is at best theoretical.
Furthermore, in those investment disputes which have affected U. S.
relations with foreign governments, either the investment was not insured by OPIC or the amount of OPIC insurance was relatively small
and did not affect the bilateral problems arising from the disputes. This
demonstrates that the basis for U. S. Government involvement in such
disputes is separate from and independent of OPIC insurance. Moreover,
there is no reason to expect that OPIC will cause the U. S. Government to
be an unwilling party to such disputes in the future. OPIC operates
under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. If OPIC's
specific interest were to run counter to the overall U. S. foreign policy
interest, the President could and doubtless would exercise his power to
require OPIC to subordinate its goals to overall U. S. policies.
Even from a theoretical standpoint, it has been recognized that investment insurance does have a role to play in reducing the likelihood
of government-to-government confrontations over investment disputes.
For example, in an article last summer in The American Iournal of International Law, Stanley Metzger, Professor of International Law at
Georgetown University, stated:
These programs have the substantial virtue of tending to depoliticize international disputes over approved investments in
virtue of the fact that the Investor is paid off under a domestic
insurance policy, leaving only money issues between governments . . . . Such a system represents a clear gain over having
a major international contretemps each time a developing country decides to nationalize one or another sector of its
economy. . . .
More significant than the theories about how OPIC might or might
not involve the U. S. Government in disputes are the practical conclusions
to be drawn from actual experience which show how OPIC has benefited
the U. S. Government, the insured investor, and the host government in
forestalling and settling disputes.
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OPIC's relationship to its insured investments continues over the life
of a project, from the planning and construction stages, through start-up
of operations and production maturity.
OPIC seeks to minimize risks in the first instance through project
selectivity involving negotiations with the investor over the mode and
terms of the investment to be insured. By sharing relevant information,
OPIC and the investor are better able to make informed decisions concerning the risks involved.
Investors are encouraged to structure their investments in ways
which minimize risks, and in certain cases, OPIC suggests that the investor insist that the developing country protect its interests by retaining
the assistance of specialized outside consultants.
During the life of a project, the investor is required to provide OPIC
with factual information material to the project's operations and OPIC's
possible liability, and OPIC's consent is required if the investor changes
the form of investment. These and other provisions establish a dynamic
relationship between OPIC and the investor which helps both parties
foresee future problems and creates a means for their solution.
In the event problems arise, OPIC has a variety of tools available
for preventing or resolving disputes. These include the following:
(1) Settlement Experience. During its first two and one-half years,
49 claims have been handled by OPIC's claims staff, involving approximately $440 million in potential liability. Twenty-five claims, amounting
to more than $129 million, have already been settled to the satisfaction of
the insured company. This represents almost three times the number of
claims paid during the first 22 years of the program. With this experience,
OPIC is able to formulate a settlement strategy based on the particular
facts of each dispute.
(2) Keeping the Investor Out Front. A fundamental part of
OPIC's strategy is to keep the investor "out front" in negotiating with the
foreign government. This not only reduces the possibility of a governmentto-government confrontation, but also makes certain that complex commercial facts about the investment are available. OPIC has found that the
requirement in the insurance contract for a one-year waiting period for
expropriatory action to become compensable is useful as a "cooling off"
period for the investor and the foreign government as well as providing
time for the development of facts and the conduct of negotiations.
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(3) Auditing Rights. In a dispute involving an uninsured investment, the U. S. Government is often called upon to make representations
on behalf of a U. S. company without adequate financial information to
support the company's claim. In contrast, OPIC's insurance contract gives
it the right to audit the financial records and accounts of the investor and
foreign enterprise in order to verify the amount of the investor's loss.
Such detailed information helps facilitate settlement discussions between
the investor and the foreign government, particularly where the dispute is
over the value of the investment.
(4) Restructuring of Investment. OPIC helps to restructure investments which in their original form have become unacceptable to the
host government. In a recent case, for example, the local government objected to a management contract held by the investor who also owned a
substantial portion of the equity in the foreign enterprise. A potential
conflict was avoided when the investor cancelled the management contract in exchange for the buy-out of its equity interest with a portion of
the deferred pay-out guaranteed by OPIC.
(5) Introduction of a Third Party. In certain cases, OPIC has
introduced an independent third party as a potential purchaser of an
investor's interest, as a mediator, or as a fact-finder. ADELA, for example, served as a mediator in a recent case where the relationship between the investor and the foreign government had seriously deteriorated.
ADELA's efforts and OPIC's involvement resulted in a cash payment by
the government which resolved the dispute.
(6) Use of OPIC's Good Offices. OPIC can provide direct assistance in the settlement process by using its good offices and those of the
State Department. In a recent case, an investor's local partners were
imprisoned and the investor's representative was able to enter the country
to meet with local officials, thereby opening the way to compensation
negotiations which otherwise would have been stalled.
(7) Claims Settlement Guaranties. Perhaps the most interesting
and useful tool developed by OPIC for the amelioration of investment
disputes is the claims settlement guaranty. Under its statute, OPIC is authorized to settle claims on such terms and conditions as it may determine. Through this authority, OPIC has been able to translate investment disputes into business arrangements which have presented an acceptable solution for both the host government and the U.S. investor.
The guaranties work as follows. During the one-year period in which an
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expropriatory action must last in order to be compensable, an insured
investor must pursue and preserve all remedies in the host country, including negotiations for compensation from the expropriating government.
If the investor, with or without OPIC's assistance, is able to work out a
compensatory arrangement with the host government, OPIC can, in appropriate cases, back up that arrangement with a guaranty based on its
insurance liability. In other words, OPIC changes its insurance liability
into a guaranty of the investor-host government compensation agreement,
which is triggered if and when the host government fails to make payment. An example of this type of settlement was the nationalization of
the property of Bethlehem Steel Corporation in Chile. A.I.D. had insured
approximately $18 million of Bethlehem's investment. In close cooperation
with OPIC, Bethlehem negotiated a sale of its properties to the Chilean
State Steel agency, for approximately $22 million, on deferred payment
terms extending over a 16-year period. Because OPIC was willing to
guarantee the payment of up to $18 million of the purchase price, Bethlehem was willing to accept the deferred payment terms of the negotiated
sale.
Other examples of this or similar uses of the OPIC claims settlement
guaranties include the Braden and Parsons & Whittemore settlements in
Chile, and the Mina Matilde settlement in Bolivia.

AVOIDING FUTURE DISPUTES
In addition to formulating ways to settle investment disputes, OPIC
has also been working to develop means of using its programs to avoid
future disputes.
OPIC's project selectivity and monitoring have already been mentioned. In addition, OPIC encourages the multinationalization of large
projects, including joint ventures with local or third-country partners and
the participation of multinational institutions such as the IFC or private
international investment companies like ADELA or PICA.
Also, OPIC has formulated new contracts to insure contractual investments, including production-sharing agreements, construction contracts, and other non-equity investments. Many feel that these and other
"new mode" investments may be more resistant to expropriation, particularly where they contribute to the host country's foreign exchange
reserves or serve as a substitution for imports.
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An example of OPIC's new contractual insurance is the recently
approved contract insuring an investment in a geothermal steam facility
to generate electrical power in a developing country. The investment by
the U. S. firm is actually a long-term technical service contract with
no equity in the project. For an initial period under the service contract,
the investor's expenditures will exceed fees received from the production
and sale of electrical power. OPIC will provide insurance coverage for
these deficits. The risks covered include the failure of the host govern.
ment's power authority to submit disputes to arbitration as called for by
the service contract, failure of the power authority to abide by arbitration awards, and inconvertibility of fees received by the investor under
the contract.
OPIC also believes that investment disputes can be avoided by
multinationalization of the insurance program, and by sharing its risks
with other insurers, both public and private.
To this end, OPIC has taken the following steps:
First, a reinsurance arrangement with various syndicates of Lloyds
of London and several European insurance companies has been concluded
involving the placement for approximately $410,000,000 of OPIC expropriation liability in some 70 countries. This is the largest amount of
expropriation liability ever to be placed in a private reinsurance market,
and the first time the U. S. Government has been able to break into the
private market.
Second, OPIC has been negotiating with insurance agencies of other
developed nations the creation of an Association of Investment Insurers
under the auspices of the Berne Union, the existing organization of credit
insurers. The Association would provide independent experts for conciliation, informal good offices and investment-appraisal services in expropriation disputes. OPIC is also hopeful that the Association will some
day result in reinsurance pooling among member agencies, and has
asked Congress for authority to engage in such pooling.
Finally, OPIC has been negotiating with the United States private
insurance industry for formation of an insurance syndicate, backed in
part by OPIC reinsurance, which would issue expropriation and inconvertibility insurance. This is considered an exciting breakthrough and
Congressional approval is being sought for such an arrangement.
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OPIC'S PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA
A third issue which has been raised in the OPIC hearings is the
question of why there has been a reduction in OPIC's operations in Latin
America.
Although there are a number of factors contributing to the decline
of insured Latin American projects, including far fewer large extractive
investments, perhaps the most important factor has been the adoption
by several Latin American countries of the Andean Code, with its severe
restrictions on foreign investments and its prohibition of investment agreements providing for subrogation of an investors' interests to a foreign
government agency or international arbitration of disputes arising out of
private investment.
Regarding the Code's investment restrictions, it may well be that the
Andean countries will find that modifications of the Code will be required in order to attract adequate foreign investment. However, in the
meantime, the extent of U.S. private investment in the Andean countries
will depend in large part on the ability of the investors and the host governments to negotiate mutually satisfactory arrangements within the restrictions. As I have pointed out, OPIC's insurance is sufficiently flexible
to permit coverage of the type of contractual and joint venture investments
which may be required.
A preliminary barrier which must be overcome, however, is the
Code's prohibition of traditional bilateral investment agreements, calling
for subrogation and international arbitration. Although OPIC's statute
does not require that subrogation rights or international arbitration be
spelled out in its agreements with host governments, the State Department has traditionally insisted on such provisions and some 85 countries
have agreed to their inclusion in agreements approving the institution
of OPIC's programs.
The Latin American attitude evidenced by the Calvo Doctrine and the
objection to subrogation appears to represent a desire to avoid confrontations with foreign governments. The position of our State Department
insisting upon international arbitration of investment disputes is also based
upon a desire to avoid confrontations with foreign governments. Since our
objectives are the same, a reasonable solution should be possible.
For the past year OPIC has been working on finding a solution to
this very difficult problem in conjunction with the State Department, and
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with several of the Andean countries. The Subcommittee on Foreign
Economic Policy of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives also has taken an active interest in this issue, and it is
expected that its report on the recent OPIC hearings will recommend that
the Executive Branch adopt a flexible approach on this issue. In the
meantime, OPIC's management has recommended to its Board of Directors that OPIC utilize other means to protect its interests as insurer of
investments in Andean Code countries. Hopefully, all parties concerned
- OPIC, the State Department, Congress, investors and the Andean
countries- will soon arrive at a solution permitting OPIC to once again
assist in the stimulation of investments which are approved by and
beneficial to both the United States and the Andean countries.

